We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy ε−equilibria for all ε > 0. We show by examples that there are:
Introduction
Recently, there has been an attempt to extent Nash's existence result [3] from finite normal form games to infinite-action games with discontinuous payoff functions (see Baye et al. [1] , Dasgupta and Maskin [2] , Reny [4] and Simon [5] ). The most general result is due to Reny [4] , which showed that a quasiconcave normal form game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if it is better-reply secure.
Better-reply security combines and generalizes two intuitive conditions, payoff security 1 and reciprocal upper semicontinuity. 2 Our goal is to study whether any such condition alone is enough to guarantee, in quasiconcave games, the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria or, at least, the existence of pure strategy ε−equilibria, for all ε > 0.
We provide two examples that show that we cannot drop either of the two condition and still obtain a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Both games in the examples are simples games, games in which each player's payoff function is simple (i.e., has a finite range). Since a simple game has a Nash equilibrium if and only if it has ε−equilibria for all ε > 0 (see proposition 2) , our examples also show that neither payoff security nor reciprocal upper semicontinuity alone are enough to guarantee the existence of pure strategy ε−equilibrium, for all ε > 0, in quasiconcave games.
When applied to the mixed extension of a normal form game, Reny's Theorem asserts that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists for a given normal form game provided that its mixed extension is payoff secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous. It is useful to know when we can conclude that the mixed extension of a given normal form game satisfies those conditions by studying the properties of the original game, since the analysis of the latter is typically easier than that of its mixed extension. In this line of research, Reny showed that a sufficient condition for the mixed extension of a given normal form game to be reciprocally upper semicontinuous is that the sum of the payoff function of the original game is upper semicontinuous.
Given the above result, we ask whether the payoff security of the mixed extension of a given normal form game follows from the payoff security of 1 "Payoff security requires that for every strategy x, each player has a strategy that virtually guarantees the payoff he receives at x, even if the others deviate slightly from x" (Reny [4] ).
2 "Reciprocal upper semicontinuity requires that some player's payoff jumps up whenever some other player's payoff jumps down" (Reny [4] ).
the original game. We use the example in Sion and Wolfe [6] to show that this conjecture is false. This implies that non-quasiconcave, payoff secure, reciprocally upper semicontinuous games may fail to have mixed strategy equilibria.
Normal form games
A normal form game G consists of a finite set of players N = {1, ..., n}, and, for every player i ∈ N, a pure strategy set X i , represented by a nonempty topological space, and a payoff function U i : X → R, where X = × i∈N X i . A normal form game is said to be simple if for all i ∈ N , U i is a simple function (i.e., a function with the property that its range is a finite set).
Throughout, the product of any number of sets is endowed with the product topology. Given a player i ∈ N , the symbol −i denotes "all players but i." In particular,
The vector of the players' payoff functions will be denoted by U : X → R N and is defined by U (x) = (U 1 (x), ..., U n (x)) for every x ∈ X. The graph of U is the subset of X × R n given by {(x, u) ∈ X × R n : u = U (x)}. It will be denoted by graph(U ).
Given a player i ∈ N , we say that player i can secure a payoff of Reny [4] ).
A payoff function U i for player i ∈ N is payoff secure if for every x ∈ X and every ε > 0, player i can secure a payoff of U i (x) − ε at x (see Reny [4] ). Simon [5] and Reny [4] ). 3 A game G = N,
Let M i be the set of all regular probability measures in
Finally, we define the mixed extension of G to beG = N,
Given ε > 0, a pure strategy ε−equilibrium of G is x * ∈ X such that, for all i ∈ N and
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G, and a mixed strategy ε−equilibrium of G is a pure strategy ε−equilibrium ofG.
On the Existence of Nash Equilibria
The following is an example of a simple, quasiconcave and payoff secure game that doesn't possess any pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Since a simple game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it has an ε−equilibrium for all ε > 0 (proposition 2), we conclude that payoff security is not enough to guarantee the existence of pure strategy ε−equilibrium, for all ε > 0, in quasiconcave games.
and U 2 : X → R be defined by
Their graphs are illustrated in figure 1 :
The game G 1 is quasiconcave and payoff secure but has no pure strategy ε−equilibrium, if ε > 0 is small enough. In particular, G 1 has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. One easily checks that G 1 is quasiconcave:
and for 1/2 < x 2 ≤ 1,
Similarly, for 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ 1/2,
and for 1/2 < x 1 ≤ 1,
Hence, G 1 is quasiconcave.
As for payoff security: to show that U 1 is payoff secure it is enough to show that U 1 is payoff secure at (x 1 , x 2 ) satisfying x 1 = 0 and x 2 > 1/2. This is so because in points x at which U 1 (x) = 0 there is noting to show, and in the remaining case, i.e., when U 1 (x) = 1, U 1 is continuous. If x 1 = 0 and x 2 > 1/2 then U 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 2. Letx 1 = 0 and V x 2 be the open ball centered at x 2 with radius δ = x 2 − 1/2. Then U 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 2 for all x 2 ∈ V x 2 . Similarly for U 2 it is enough to consider the following two cases: the first is when x 2 = 0 and 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ 1/2, in which case we letx 2 = 0; and the second is when x 2 = 1/2 and x 1 > 1/2, in which case we letx 2 = 1/2 and V x 1 be the open ball centered at x 1 with radius δ = x 1 − 1/2. Hence, G 1 is payoff secure.
Letting β i denote player i's best reply correspondence, we obtain
and
Since their graphs don't intercept, it follows that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Also, we can conclude from proposition 2 that G has no pure strategy ε−equilibrium, if ε > 0 is small enough. As claimed above, for simples games the existence of Nash equilibria is equivalent to the existence of ε−equilibria for all ε > 0.
Proposition 2 Let G = N, (X i , U i ) i∈N be a simple game. Then, G has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if G has a pure strategy ε−equilibrium, for all ε > 0.
Proof. Since necessity is obvious, we prove only sufficiency.
. It follows that if x * ∈ X is an ε−equilibrium, which exists by assumption, then x * is a Nash equilibrium,
, for all x i ∈ X i , given the way ε was constructed.
The following is an example of a simple, quasiconcave and reciprocally upper semicontinuous game that doesn't possess any pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Hence, we conclude that reciprocally upper semicontinuity is not enough to guarantee the existence of pure strategy ε−equilibrium in quasiconcave games.
Their graphs are illustrated in figure 2:
Proposition 3 The game G 2 is quasiconcave and reciprocally upper semicontinuous but has no pure strategy ε−equilibrium, if ε > 0 is small enough. In particular, G 2 has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first show that G 2 is reciprocally upper semicontinuous: Let α ∈ R. We have that
Since
it follows that both {U 1 + U 2 ≥ 2} and {U 1 + U 2 ≥ 1} are closed. Hence, U 1 +U 2 is upper semicontinuous and G 2 is reciprocally upper semicontinuous.
We show in what follows that G 2 is quasiconcave:
and if 1 < α ≤ 2,
Similarly, for 0 < α ≤ 1,
and for 1 < α ≤ 2,
Hence, G 2 is quasiconcave.
for all x 2 ∈ X 2 and
Since their graphs don't intercept, it follows that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Hence, G has no pure strategy ε−equilibrium, if ε > 0 is small enough.
When applied to the mixed extension of a normal form game G, Reny's Theorem 3.1 [4] asserts that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists for G provided thatG is payoff secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous. It is useful to know when we can conclude thatG satisfies those conditions by studying the properties of G, since the analysis of G is typically easier than that ofG. In this line of research, Reny showed that a sufficient condition for G to be reciprocally upper semicontinuous is that Σ i∈N U i is upper semicontinuous, because this will imply that Σ i∈N v i is upper semicontinuous, which in turn implies thatG is reciprocally upper semicontinuous.
Given the above result, we ask whether the payoff security ofG follows from the payoff security of G. The following example shows that the fact that a game is payoff secure in pure strategies does not imply that it is payoff secure in mixed strategies. [6] ) Let G 3 be described by N = {1, 2}, X 1 = X 2 = [0, 1], U 1 : X → R be defined by
Example 3 (Sion and Wolfe
The graph of U 1 is illustrated in figure 3 : x 1
The game G 3 is payoff secure but its mixed extensionG 3 is not.
Proof. One easily checks that G 3 is payoff secure. For player 1, it is enough to consider x ∈ X such that U 1 (x) = 0 since when U 1 (x) = −1 there is noting to show, and U 1 is continuous in the remaining case (i.e., for x such that U 1 (x) = 1). If x 1 = x 2 , we letx 1 = 1 except when x 1 = 1, in which case we letx 1 = 0; if x 2 = x 1 + 1/2, we letx 1 = 0 except when x 1 = 1/2, in which case we letx 1 = 1. In all these cases we can find a neighborhood V x 2 of x 2 such that U 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 for all x 2 ∈ V x 2 .
For player 2, it is again enough to consider x ∈ X such that U 1 (x) = 0. We letx 2 = x 1 + 1/4 except when x = (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 1), in which case we let x 2 = 1. In all these cases we can find a neighborhood V x 1 of x 1 such that U 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = 1 for all x 1 ∈ V x 1 .
Also, since G 3 is a zero-sum game, so isG 3 ; hence,G 3 is reciprocally upper semicontinuous. However, as Sion and Wolfe [6] have shown, G 3 has no Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed), and so it follows from Reny's Theorem thatG 3 is not payoff secure.
Sion and Wolfe [6] have shown that G 3 has no Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed); hence, G 3 is also an example of a (non-quasiconcave) reciprocally upper semicontinuous and payoff secure game without Nash equilibria.
